General speculation on Saharan kidnapping tactics
 

[Interesting topic but lifted from 'Mori post Nov 29' to avoid derailing]

... The Mauri army knew where they were but could do nothing besides allow AQ-M free passage (that in order to keep the prisoners alive). That, I understand, is the basis for the passage of the Austrians who were taken from Tunisia to N Mali via Libya/Algeria. Its the same off Somalia. A destroyer can stand-off from a 30 foot yacht filled with pirates + hostages and do absolutely nothing.

There are some interesting, open questions. Why no kidnappings in Algeria or Libya? Is Gadaffi an important link for the ransom payments and, in response, have AQ-M made a deal to stay clear? In Algeria, perhaps it is the guides, who sign their live's and the lives of of their families away to look after their clients. But why exactly do AQ-M care about the guide and the guide's family? I don't understand that part.


If there hasn't been any kidnappings in Libya I would think it is because nobody wants to mess with Qadaffi. And in Algeria, there are too many gendarmes. Niger and Mali is much easier.

I would broadly agree with this (blue) response to the question.

On the other hand I'm doubtful the 2008 Austrians were allowed free passage by the army etc across Alg to north Mali (more likely than via Lib & Niger IMO) in a "we'd like to do something but we dare not" kind of way (like the navy ship in the Indian Ocean). The Alg army has suffered enough at the hands of the GSPC/AQIM.
For the same reason assuming the Mori army did actually catch up with them earlier in the week and not have a go, it would not be for wanting to try. More likely on instructions from Spanish diplomats. [Added 6/12: it seems they did catch up as reported but dared not/were told not to make a move]

IMO the Austrian transit of Algeria in 2008 was either with collusion or "turning a blind eye/get them out of here quick, we don't want to be involved" not a powerless acceptance. The former (collusion) is thought to be the origin of 2003 anyway (as Ulrich has noted) and the latter is my theory on how 2003-Group 1 got to end up in north Mali.

In Algeria, perhaps it is the guides, who sign their live's and the lives of of their families away to look after their clients. But why exactly do AQ-M care about the guide and the guide's family?

As I suggest elsewhere, I think that may be a red herring. By their actions AQIM prove they don't give a toss about a ruining a desert tourist guide's livelihood, that is for sure. It's just become a new 'Yemeni-style' business, no matter how much AQIM dress it up with ideology.

Ch

A fascinating thread! If the reason is purely financial then i wonder if these N African groups are actually A-Q, as i fear the group proper are hardly strapped for cash (considering their funding heartland)... just a thought.

This is the intriguing thing and something I have puzzled over. If the guys with the beards showed up with intent for business, there is absolutely nothing that anyone would be able to do. The beards are in charge immediately. But the fact seems to be that the guys with the beards do not show up in Algeria when one is accompanied by Algerian guides. Why? One set of possibilities (and this was behind my initial comment) is:
1) the guides sign up responsibility for the tourists (this is a fact)
2) the authorities make it clear to the guides that the guides have this responsibility and that there are consequences if things go wrong (this is quoted as being the case by some who have acted as guides). I don't know any more details about this.
3) this is the big jump in logic + without any evidence - the bearded ones may not want to put the guides in a position where consequences are imposed on them - so they don't take from guided parties in Algeria.

Why is (3) true? Only because it seems to be the case that it is true. To uncover the background to this claim is to get into the heart of the AQ-M relationship with local people. AQ-M are raging the state and the west but not the locals. From where I am sitting they seem to have strict codes by which they work. The lack of action in the desert in Algeria may be an indication of these codes at work. One kidnapping of a guided party in DZ is all that it takes to wash away point (3). I'm not meaning to tempt fate.....

I would be more inclined to think that MBM and Aqim are staying south of the Algerian border by some kind of agreement with an entity that could be the military.
But I think the actual reason is that it is better for business to stay in Mali and Niger.
If they wanted to, they could easily abduct tourists around Tam or Djanet today. Or blow up a pipeline. Easy. But they don't.

The agreement between guides/agencies and government/military is meant to keep check on tourists moving around. It is not the law.
What the guide says about responsibility is solely to motivate his salary.

When you ask, you never get full answers. They only know a few things from their limited perspective, be they guides, gendarmes, politicians. Those few who know do not speak.
There are probably some high level ops who know the full story but they never tell.
And so Algeria is a great mystery. Has been for decades. Perhaps always was.

Our guide (who was not a real guide but a friend), didn't have any salary, he did it for free, so he had nothing to motivate


I agree

Let's not forget that if there is indeed some kind of agreement in the desert, as suggested, up north it's business as usual, with locals as always, very much a target:

... Algerian terrorist groups have stepped up their kidnapping attempts in recent months, mainly in Kabylie and the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou. Victims usually hail from wealthy families that can afford to pay steep ransoms. The most recent hostage situation occurred on October 30th, when members of al-Qaeda's El Ansar brigade kidnapped a business owner from his workplace in Tigzirt, Tizi Ouzou province.

(From Maghrebia archives, Nov 9)

Around that time a few weeks ago there were also attacks/bombs as far south as Ghardaia wilaya - but also pro-active army ops against AQIM convoys further west in El Bayadh wilaya and the GE Occ.

If AQIM kill and mutilate less locals than they used to do in the GSPC days (and yes, some of these were army-dressed-up-as... ops), it's only because they finally realised it was bad for their image and also because lately they've erred towards general purpose extortion and other profitable crime.

Ch

Not just cash
 

I reckon the AQ-M motivation is more than money. Money from kidnaping partly finances what they do. But if you look at the targets for the kidnapping (NGO-aid intervention in the Mauri event, Canadian Diplomats bound up in the Niger peace process, westerners attending the desert concert), the message is that they go to some trouble to locate specific targets and the common element in the list of those targeted is that they were seeking to engage with or influence the Saharan region. Tourists on a desert trip have, since 2003, been the minority amongst those taken. Additionally, the net is spread very wide - Mauri-Tunisia-Niger-Mali. Seems to me they are seeking to limit western influence on the Sahara region, seeking to control the as much of the Sahara as possible and doing so in a way that also finances their mission. If their mission was just money, I can't see they'd go all the way to Tunisia and all the way to Mauri (with their HQ in N.Mali). Assuming the Mauri hit was AQ-M and that they're on the crossing to N.Mali now, then that is quite some undertaking. Its only been done twice by westerners in the last 4 decades - Chris the more recent of the two. Its would be hard to explain that bold hit purely on a cash basis.

Meant also to add - will be interesting to see the fate of the oil enterprise following the exploration in the Toudenni basin in N Mali.

It would be hard to explain that bold hit purely on a cash basis

Yes, didnt mean to imply that, that would make them regular crims. It was more to remind that Alg locals are getting it too and in N Mali they - or bandits associated with AQIM activities - will rob locals on general opportunistic principles as someone mentioned (and as I encountered myself in 2006).

Last I heard AQIM also want to smash the [Algerian] state which most mafias dont bother with (or the state is the mafia).

Taoudenni - yes right in the thick of it and a Sonatrach (DZ) operation too. There may be tunnels.

Ch

Simple thugs
 

I think one should see them as simpleminded thugs. Only difference is that in order to aid recruiting more "warriors" they need to target westerners, giving them a thin disguise as jihadists.
Look at all the rebel movements of the past. Once the rebellion is over, the hardcore ideologists usually come out as regular criminals, enjoying the glory of blowing innocent people to pieces, smuggling drugs, kidnapping, bank robberies....think IRA, FARC, ETA....
Tunnels?
Did they strike oil yet anywhere in Mali?
Yes, the state is always the mafia (extortion, abuse of power...).

Its always interesting to get the range of perspectives. I see them somewhat differently. To me, they come across as principled, strategic, committed, careful, patient, daring and resourceful. Its just that their world is orthogonal to most of ours. That said, I'd prefer it if they hadn't adopted the Sahara!

They may be pretty good at what they're doing, but kidnapping unarmed civilians in the desert isn't rocket science. Nor is ambushing Malian soldiers. Or shooting a teacher on a Nouakchott street. Planting roadside explosives. Brainwashing young suicide bombers. Etc.

100% opportunistic thugs.

Totally disagree priffe. Ok so you dont have to be specially trained to point a gun at someone and lead them away, but you have to have balls. Planting explosives requires technical competance. The last think you want to do is underestimate an enemy combatant when he/she is prepared to die for their cause. To be opportunistic requires adaptability, and the first thing they teach you as a combat soldier is to adapt to your enemy.

So they're pretty good at what they do.

Tactical/logistical considerations
 

Thanks Chris for establishing a cooler climate (thread) where we can openly discuss our intuitions and share our experiences regarding tactics, logistics and the who responsible for ongoing crimes in the Sahara region.

Granted, my "on the road" African experience is limited to 3 weeks travel in Morocco, but I have 17 years in Mexico, Central and South America where, kidnapping is also problem, even for a few motorcycle adventurists.

I have all my chips on the table betting that the tactics employed regarding the 3 Spanish "volunteers who went missing off Maui's main road, were well planned, perhaps with local/inside assistance as opposed to an opportunistic strike. Here is why.

1. According to international press releases, those who went missing were described as more than "cooperantes" Spanish term used to describe the volunteers who help distribute relief via convoy etc. Who they are and who/what they represent is readily available in past press releases.

2. Apparently, arguably, the 3 "highest rank" "cooperantes" were trailing the convoy, a logic defying order of march.

Therefore, I also bet the tactics included the targeting of these specific people, and logistics that included a hand off/selling of the hostages to a third party.

Logistically, I still hold with the idea of some earthen, underground, cave, mine etc is being/was utilized. I agree with those who forward the idea of the "human shield" tactic as a strong possibility, but also hold that the plan was not to transport, via land, to Mali, but by much swifter transport to another location in Mauritania and then out of the West African region.

Eat, Drink and Be Careful xfiltrate

EDIT: Chris, I rode out 150 K (very wet) to welcome my friend Jeff Condon, and the Globebusters Saturday 05dec, they have arrived safely Buenos Aires. Kev and Julia were pleased with the tour.

xfiltrate, you have to put meat on those bones.
Why a boat?
Why a cave?
While clearly a possibility, why a third party?
They snatched the last car, so how could they have targeted individuals?

Been trying to read up on the subject. Aqim desert branch doesn't seem hard to understand. Motivate recruits on religious grounds. Generate cash to buy weapons and power. Have close connection to drug smuggling and other criminal activities.
Talk about reviving al-Andalus. Then kidnap spaniards. Take them straight to the safe areas. Settle down, let a few weeks go by, then make claims for release of Al Qaeda prisoners in spanish jails. When that doesn't work, settle for huge ransom.
As noone has claimed responsibility yet, it leaves room for politically motivated accusations, such as Morocco suggesting Polisario involvement, or Algerian sources pointing at Morocco.
I could of course be dead wrong, but isn't this what we're seeing now?

So let us speculate on what is going on.

As for Algeria, I only get more confused the more I read, esp. from sites like this Algeria-Watch: Information on the Human Rights Situation in Algeria
They use what someone called "reverse science" - you start out with a hypothesis. Find all the evidence that can be made to seen as supporting your theory and disregard the rest. Arrange the chosen facts using lots of references and build your own logic. Present it as the unquestionable truth. Mr Keenan is a good example of this kind of writing.
One of the more interesting theories was that the Algerian situation can be understood as a power struggle between Bouteflika/parts of the army on one side, and the DRS (Secret Service) on the other. That may explain some of the bewildering developments in Algeria over the last decade or so. But how could we know anything about this? Until someone on the inside decides to tell the story.

Libya - I am thinking that general Qadaffy has monopolised the right to practice terrorism in his country, just as he has monopilised everything else. Thus no kidnappings or even attempts.

Two kidnap attempts in Niger botched so far this fall (Arlit and Tahoua, scant reporting on these incidents - no journalists allowed to work in Niger perhaps?). So Aqim may not be as good at their job as some think they are. edit - at least the first kidnapping may have been done by others than aqim
In Niger, they had this unit Niger Rapid Intervention Company - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia that were trained by the Americans.
They reportedly defected wholesale to become part of the rebellion in 2007.

Why haven't the Americans set up a similar unit in Mali? Or have they? It is exactly what they need in northeastern Mali.
Would Bamako allow such a unit, consisting of touaregs expertly trained, equipped and motivated? Here's an American training Mali soldiers in 2008
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...FG_in_Mali.jpg
I am thinking such a unit could do away with Aqim in one short season, especially with a little air support. They should preferrably wait until kidnapping season's over and all hostages released. And the desert turned to mud. :)
Wouldn't this mean saving huge money in the long run? Rather than paying 10 M€ ransoms every year.
The MBMs of the desert could then restrain themselves to other lines of work.
But Bamako perhaps have had it with touareg soldiers: "Public and government in Mali appeared shocked by the level of violence in the north of Kidal, Ménaka and the Sahel region, as well as by the effectiveness of the rebel force, which the government has said is led by Ibrahim Bahanga, a Malian Armed Forces officer who had deserted early in the summer of 2007."
Tuareg Rebellion (2007–present) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

So place your bets - where will the Aqim strike next?
And feel free to disagree.

All nicely summed up priffe. Or at least that's the way I see it too.

Would Bamako allow such a unit, consisting of touaregs expertly trained, equipped and motivated?

I would have thought not a chance, even if they're probably the guys who could do it. How hard can it be in north Mali (as I have said many times before here). If the Moris had radars protecting fennecs several years ago, surely now the tech is up to finding, tracking and liquidating AQIM in open desert.

The Americans have been spending and 'training' in the Sahel since 2004, changing the name of the Initiative or Operation from time to time. What good has come of it? Not much in Niger from what you say and there was a theory that these ops were some ploy by Germany-based US 'Africa/Middle East Command' or something to help justify their budget or existence - but maybe that was a Keenanism that got stuck to my shoe at some point).

But after the Mali Tuareg have finished off AQIM they'll have more gear and know-how to carry on fighting for the concessions they want - or so Bamako might fear. And possibly some in the Mali army/state are talking a cut from or involved with AQIM smuggling ops (as exposed just after 2003). These southern kickbacks may all be lost once Tuaregs move in on them.

So Mali leaves it as it is, no one of any consequence gets harmed up in the empty desert apart from occasional unlucky foreign hostage, AQ aren't banging at the walls of Bamako any time soon and meantime a few get a nice new VX to go with the villa.

Ch

Argentine "asado"
 

Priffe, your Argentine "asado" reference was not lost here. But the "meat" on the bones of my analysis will come through the filter of official press releases that are like an "asado al punto" tender but without blood.

You, yourself have helped to flesh out my armchair analysis.

1. My "much swifter transport to another location in Mauritania" included but was not limited to "boats," as this is a general speculation forum my reasoning was based on this article.

Latin American drug cartels find home in West Africa - CNN.com Latin American drug cartels find home in West Africa - CNN.com

And the following data:

Your own Aqim desert branch description alleged "close connection to drug smuggling.

Latin American drug smugglers have "boats," aircraft and quickly become known, feared, and integrated into areas en route to market.

The province of Puerto Limón, Costa Rica, for example, has been infiltrated by the Colombians, to the extent that the cartel has voice in the Costa Rican legislature and in another voice instructs the "authorities" to leave them alone in Puerto Limón or there will be violence in the capital San Jose.

These "tactics" are also also evident in other Central American Republics since US/Mexican operations have pressured the cartels to create more southern routes to the US market.

Horrific murders as well as the kidnapping of high value targets for prisoner exchange as ransom, is a common along all of the cartels drug routes.

Why would the Latin American cartels abandon tactics that have worked well in Latin America and create new tactics for the West African route to the EU market?

2. I am a practicing "remote viewer" google: Ingo Swan, Hal Puthoff, Stanford University's government funded research project "remote viewing, Army/CIA remote viewing programs or Maj. Ed Dames if you are unfamiliar with remote viewing. Much of what is known about remote viewing is still classified.

I am also well read in scientology as are the founders of the official remote viewing programs utilized during the cold war.

Before it was international news that one of the missing was CEO of a large company that tunnels through mountains, under cities (subways) etc I posted on another thread about a potential underground location, in retrospect I may have been picking up on the credentials of this particular hostage. A person with an interesting vocation that might have attracted the interest of the cartels.

The cartels have little trouble buying information and services from local inhabitants along their routes to market, they have unlimited resources compared to the resources available to nations struggling to combat them.

A second remote viewing session resulted again in some underground dwelling as a place the hostages were taken. The Latin American cartels have constructed and utilized underground passageways to transport their product. Why would this be different in West Africa?

3. You have already concluded the identity of my referenced third party.

Eat, Drink and Be Careful xfiltrate

I would also broadly agree with this response.

Additionally, the Libyans are unlikely to tolerate what Keenan sees as the driving force behind AQiM - creating a foothold for the Americans to send in their advisers.

The Egyptians, in turn, seem to be generally interested in having the Americans on their western, not southern border. Hence, they are happy tolerating low key smuggling activities, as long as these do not follow any political agenda.

The three incidents over the last few years (all reported as criminally rather than politically motivated) have now produced two, undermanned and undereqipped, small army outposts on the border with Sudan. They can't control the movement of people across the border along the stretch of 350km between Al Uwainat and the army base at Bir Tarfawi, but they can help monitoring the ins and outs of various groups and alert Cairo to any new developements.

It appears to me that as long as the bad guys carry arms for Gazaand drugs and people for Europe, there's noting to worry the Egyptians. But if they start plying their business in the name of jihad, the Egyptians will have to pounce down on them, and the thriving export-import business will suffer.

And finally, perhaps the most important factor, is logistics. It is more difficult in the Western Desert than elsewhere, with very few dissatisfied or unruly local groups around to help organising fuel and water depots.

I am also thinking it (kidnappings & jihad) will come to a halt when it is hurting regular business enough. But isn't that already the case?
Today Aqim claimed the kidnaps and will be back with demands, according to Aljazeera.

Xfiltrate, I would love to possess the faculty of remote viewing but alas I have to be content with using google. You remind me of my dear friend Maciel, who was a mapuche but also a scientolog. Having asado steak & decanter of tinto near calle Florida for all of $1, talking about the strangest things. It was in 1978.

Priffe,

In Egypt, there was another incident which went unreported as it did not involve Westerners. I heard about it from a well informed (but only a singular) source. Perhaps someone could corroborate.

Some time last winter the Sudan/Chad robbers attacked a convoy of smugglers coming from Libya near Al Uwainat and captured one of them. In retaliation, the smugglers mounted a punitive expedition into Sudan and restored order in the region. The Egyptian army outposts along the border followed and now it's all nice and quiet again.

This, and other reports on the relationship between smuggling, drugs and politics, make you wonder about some issues, such as: is the army there to protect the interests of Egyptian tour operators, worth perhaps a million pounds a year, or the interests of the guys who carry goods worth a million on each weekly trip?

Just another "asado"
 

Don Priffe, continuing the strangeness, actually Einstein labeled it "strangeness at a distance" when referring to space as a viewpoint of dimension, and the unaccountable (by the accepted laws/mechanics of the physical universe) effects created upon similar molecules "at a distance."

Unexplainably, I knew the "asado" reference would be understood.

As is said upon meeting someone new in Puerto Limón, Costa Rica "May we no longer be strangers."

Interesting that you mentioned the decanted "tinto" Perhaps Google will decant the fate of the 3 Spaniards differently, but my chips are still on the table.

I worked my way through many years of graduate study as a "contracted" sommelier.

Eat, Drink and be Careful xfiltrate

Note for Xfiltrate
 

Brief posting to Xfiltrate -
as you know, The Hubb is a broad community with all manner of views and perspectives. In my experience, opinions are usually well received and alternative explanations normally get reasonable consideration. But it turns out that some of the postings deal with fairly serious issues - kidnapping being one of them. Some Hubb users have asked if you could keep to the point being discussed. I agree with them. You probably know much better than me that there are many, many places on the internet for discussing things like life as a remote viewer but that this isn't one of them. Many thanks -
Richard

Your thread, my bad....
 

Richard Washington: Yes, there are thousands of more appropriate sites for my very brief comment regarding remote viewing , but few as serious. Yes I will refrain from similar comments.

But, on the other hand, the first authentic/verified international release regarding the kidnappers came from (ennahar 08 December, 2009 02:33:00) Menaka (Mali) 3 hours ahead of Buenos Aires time and headlined "Three Spaniards detained by AQIM "hardliners""

You do the math, regarding my post 23 hours before this post agreeing with Priffe that "Your own Aqim desert branch description alleged "close connection to drug smuggling" and as you read further on was the identity of the third party referenced in my previous post.

The location of the hostages is yet to be released. Security Forces in Northern Mali announced the abductors as AQIM, but said nothing about the location of the hostages, I have speculated the 3 Spaniards are not being held in Mali.

Posted by Priffe on another thread:

Ennahar Online - Three Spaniards detained by AQIM "hardliners"

Now, that was some very serious speculating!

Future releases might or might not validate my other contributions to this thread. But, I will immediately exile myself to the HU bar, with any additional comments regarding remote viewing.

My intention here was/is not frivolous, I apologize for comments posted that may have contributed to your misunderstanding of my serious speculation regarding Saharan kidnapping tactics in play at the moment.

Eat, Drink and Be Careful xfiltrate

Folks,

Another point to be wary of is the 'mafia' environment which exisits among AQIM and their affiliates and suporters: in other words there are a number of terrorists looking to establish credibility and proof of intent and capability by carrying out attacks and kidnappings. The emphasis in the press is often on ideology and that implies a limited set of motivating factors. When you take into account the desire to go one better than your rival that puts another, slightly less pure (by that I do NOT mean I agree with the principles) tinge on the reasons behind what goes on.

There was a very interesting article in 'Jeune Afrique' recently on the power struggle in North African terrorism and the blurred lines between that and banditry. I gave my copy away unfortunately but anyone who reads French would do well do try and get a back copy.

Cheers,

Rich

Well they are thugs, plain and simple. Criminals.
One major error done in the "war on terror" is to label AQ or any of their followers as soldiers, army, etc. They're not. They don't wear uniforms or even an ID. They don't belong to any army or come from any one nation. This is not a "war". Major mistake by W.
They are thugs belonging to a criminal organization and it is a police matter.
To label them as "soldiers" is dignifying them.
Their targets are civilians, mosques. markets, hospitals, UN, the Red Cross, NGOs, tourists, skyscrapers, embassies, schools, women and children more often than soldiers of the 'enemy'.
They flourish where there is no rule of law.
They should be caught and tried in civil courts.
The Geneva Convention is not valid and can not be applied (even notwithstanding the fact that they themselves have no respect for it).
The only leader to adress the problem so far (AFAIK) is W (naming them "illegal combattants"). EU and the UN has not, other than critizising the US..
There's a great need for new definitions. An update of the Geneva Convention as it doesn't work in todays conflicts (civil wars, militias, international crime organizations, private armies such as Blackwater).
my 2 cents

Xfiltrate, sorry, but I really haven't noticed that you've contributed any non-obvious information to this thread which has since been proven correct based on your supposed capabilities.

So far I think you've said that the hostages were being held underground, had been kidnapped for their knowledge of tunnel construction, and had been taken away by boat.

Anything else we should note for validation by the facts when they emerge? I am profoundly skeptical about your and similar claims but am always ready to consider credible and convincing evidence to the contrary if it is available.

Just the facts, nothing but the facts?
 

motoreiter,

I have not noticed any factual account of how the 3 Spanish hostages were transported anywhere. I speculate that the published desert crossing into Mali, utilizing the "human shield" defense might well have been a cover operation, complete with 3 cut outs as hostages.

Here is what I actually said:

"If it was false flag, and knowing that the search would probably be mostly land oriented, the hostages might have been or might eventually be taken toward the sea, and put aboard a boat, by those perhaps not familiar with the desert. Just an idea."

I also clarified the "boat" speculation:

"Logistically, I still hold with the idea of some earthen, underground, cave, mine etc is being/was utilized. I agree with those who forward the idea of the "human shield" tactic as a strong possibility, but also hold that the plan was not to transport, via land, to Mali, but by much swifter transport to another location in Mauritania and then out of the West African region."

Is it fact that the 3 Spanish hostages are in Mali and were transported there via a desert crossing? No, these facts have not yet been established.


Nor have any facts been established concerning the tactics employed by the kidnapers to evade the rescue efforts, air cover, etc... so has my "underground speculation" been proven or not?

One established fact is that none of the 3 Spanish hostages fit the typical profile of "cooperantes" or Spanish "volunteers who help deliver relief via convoy, etc. Another fact is the senior hostage is the CEO of one of Spain's largest tunnel construction firm. My first "tunnel reference" was posted before the names and descriptions of the hostages were released.

When responding to Priffe, I agreed with the part of his post assigning culpability: By stating "You Priffe, have already concluded the identity of my referenced *third party." *the kidnappers

"Your own Aqim desert branch description alleged "close connection to drug smuggling."

This was posted, before general releases and official releases declared AQIM as claiming responsibility.

I also posted: "But the "meat" on the bones of my analysis will come through the filter of official press releases that are like an "asado al punto" tender but without blood."

And I reiterate: "Future releases might or might not validate my other contributions to this thread. But, I will immediately exile myself to the HU bar, with any additional comments regarding ........."

I most hardily agree with you when you posted: "I am profoundly skeptical about your and similar claims but am always ready to consider credible and convincing evidence to the contrary if it is available."

Eat, Drink and Be Careful xfiltrate

Where is safe?
 

Or, how safe is Morocco? And why?

...And why?

Good question. I believe it is because the Moroccans spend a lot more money and time patrolling their relatively manageable borders (as many of us find when we get too near it) as well as the secret police tracking down and crushing any dissent/insurgents (probably at the cost of a few innocent people along the way).

They like Egypt (but not like Alg, RIM, etc) have a lot to lose if tourists are frightened away.

As for alternative speculative techniques, there's a chilling new film all about it here.

Ch

Interesting articel from CTC Sentinel
AQIM and the Growth of International Investment in North Africa, PDF, 116 KB ----->http://www.desert-info.ch/download/pdf/Icons/PDF.jpg

CTC = COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT

This PDF is an excerpt of the CTC Sentinel - Volume 2-Issue 11 (November 2009)

Regards

Ulrich

Motive?
 

Urgent: Bordj Moktar/Mali border
 

For disturbing reading on the Austrians disappearance read The Dark Sahara by jeremy keenan. I think this thesis that US and Algerian secret services had something to do with the kidnappings might explain exactly why Algeria and Libya remain untouched. Some countries matter more to us than others, and its the old issue my friends - big black gold. My feeling is the whole AQIM thing is of our (the west, more specifically the US) making - we turned a group who had a valid issue with their government but who were nothing but a bunch of bandits with no popular support into something with international credibility who no longer need support. And why? BECAUSE WE WANT THEM THERE, WE WANT THERE TO BE A PROBLEM.

Having said all this, the reason i logged in was to warn everyone away from Bordj Moktar border with Mali. I just had a close shave there and if it wasnt for my local contacts I'd be with the others now. Algerian side secure, malian side - Halid - they don't care. The police just want you gone, even if it is to your capture. They are powerless to do anything. My guides were attacked 60km on from HArlid and the place felt very creepy, towards Tessalit. We had been targeted. Luckily we turned back, had sent on the cars with no tourists and we had all returned to exit Algeria by plane. The whole border regions of north and east Mali is where it is at this year. Last year it was more Niger, but word is that that is all pretty OK now.

I don't think Keenan has any answers to the many valid questions as to the extent of Algerian involvement.
Who's the "we" you're referring to? The "west"?

Please describe in more detail what happened as it is important for us who would like to travel in the region to know what is going on. Why is Niger OK? - there is scant reporting from there, but there were two attacks reported this fall.

might explain exactly why Algeria and Libya remain untouched

I dont think you can lump Libya in with Alg so readily. Although I admit 2003 was not purely a GSPC job (in other words not all of JK's speculation is rubbish), I think part of the reason these 2 countries and Morocco are less unsafe is that they are wealthy enough to operate secret police etc to do something about it. Mali and Niger are very poor countries by comparison.

Are police and customs back in Ikhalil/'Halid'? They'd abandoned it in 2006 and when we arrived from Mori and at that time there was also talk of attacks on locals on the track to Tessalit which is why we didn't go there to check out or Mali officially (having not checked in anyway).
I suspect raids on locals up there are quite common up there but of course they don't make international news.

I agree that Niger - or at least touristic Tenere (always less risky in an AQIM sense than NE Mali) may be coming out of the dark - the resumption of Le Point flights being a good indicator.

Ch

Another thought in explaining the issue of no kidnappings in Algeria since 2003 when Mali, Tunisia, Mauri & Niger have all been on the list.

So far the explanations include:
1) AQ-M deal with Alg government
2) something to do with guides and the contract they sign and the possibility that AQ-M steer clear as they don't want guides to get it in the neck (not much support on the Hubb for this BTW).

Additionally, it seems to me that the AQ-M branch in N Mali, which is responsible for the kidnappings, may have done a deal with the AQ-M branch in N Algeria - a deal along the lines that AQ-M in N Mali stay off the Algerian patch. That makes more sense to me than AQ-M doing a deal with the Algerian govt. I recall reading that AQ-M in N Mali broke away from AQ-M in N Algeria when the leader of the Mali branch didn't make it to the CEO post of AQ-M.

Sounds very plausible to me - didnt someone suggest the Jeune Afrique article said as much - or at least 'infighting' (looked for JA online but could not find it) and all the more likely if there is big money from trafficking involved. But then would N. Mali AQIM sector risk coming up all the way to Tunisia to grab the Austrians? Or maybe that was done by a breakaway NE Alg faction. Who knows.

btw, IMO the quote from Geoff D. Porter sounds like very generalised waffle to me. You could say as much for much of the developing world.

Ch

Resistance to radical islam in Mali
 

pirate sites for tourist agencies in Mauritania and Niger to obtain lists of foreign
 

Djazair News

Gogoonisch - Englisch

Regards

Ulrich

maliweb.net :: Lutte anti-terrorisme : Quand le Général ATT se trompe de cible

Gogoonisch

Regards

Ulrich

Hello,

see an actual video from Al Jazeera about the armory of Al Qaeda in Mauritania

YouTube - Al-Qaeda branch in 'Sahara Emirate' - 4 Jan 10

Regards

Ulrich

some clarity on Gaddafi's position on AQ-M:

News - Africa: Al-Qaeda members remain behind bars - Gaddafi

He doesn't want them on his patch - as many in this thread have argued.....

Al-Qaeda members remain behind bars - Gaddafi


By Lamine Ghanmi

Rabat - Libya will hold up to 300 al-Qaeda members in jail indefinitely after they have completed their prison terms to stop them staging fresh attacks, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi said on Thursday.

"These people are heretics. They are followers of (Osama) Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri. They killed a number of civilians and police," Gaddafi told a gathering of his top legislative body, referring to al-Qaeda's two global commanders.

"It is a necessity to keep them in prison. They are very dangerous as they are ready to resume killing people in our streets here or travel to Algeria or Egypt or elsewhere to stage attacks," he said in remarks broadcast on state television and monitored in Rabat.

'It is a necessity to keep them in prison'
It was not immediately clear if Gaddafi's comments marked an end to a government policy of seeking reconciliation with jailed leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a radical group with has had ties to al-Qaeda.

A Libyan civic activist involved closely in negotiations between jailed Islamists and the government said he believed that the reconciliation talks would continue, but that Gaddafi was making clear it would be on his terms.

"Gaddafi's tough tone is aimed as backing the government's stand that only Islamists who accept the government's line that no opposition to it will be tolerated, will be be freed from prison," said the activist, who did not want to be named.

Reconciliation with radicals Islamists has been one of the bones of contention in a struggle for influence between a reform-minded camp represented by one of Gaddafi's sons, Saif al-Islam, and a conservative old guard.

That struggle also has focused on Libya's lucrative energy sector, where international firms including BP and Exxon Mobile have invested billions of dollars.

Saif al-Islam has backed reconciliation efforts, and urged reform of Libya's judicial system to make it fairer.

LIFG's leaders wrote a 400-page renunciation of al-Qaeda thinking last year, and the document was held up by some Islamic scholars as a model of how to turn radical young people away from joining violent militant groups.

The LIFG staged bloody battles in oil exporter Libya in the 1990s, killing dozens of soldiers and policemen in a failed attempt to topple Gaddafi.

Libyan security forces gradually crushed the rebellion at the end of the 1990s, killing scores of Islamist fighters, and jailing hundreds of others.

Some of the group's figures fled to Afghanistan where they became close to Bin Laden and Zawahiri and took on the role of al-Qaeda ideologues.

"Who would vouch for these 300 or 100 dangerous people not getting out of jail and starting again to kill innocent people in the streets and stage bombings?" Gaddafi told the General People's Congress (GPC) at his home-town of Sirte.

Gaddafi made the comment on the prisoners after Justice Minister Mustapaha Abdeljalil had asked the Congress to accept his resignation.

He said he wanted to step down in protest at what he called the failure by the authorities to free detainees years after they had completed their prison sentences or been acquitted.

"These people constitute a danger even when the court had pronounced its verdict. Security authorities are the ones who are responsible for this matter to say whether they are dangerous or not. The court verdict is void of reason in such cases," Gaddafi said.

Gaddafi also told the minister that the congress was not the right place to discuss his resignation. - Reuters

Here's an integrative analysis on the Sahel, Al-Qaeda, drug trafficants and the recent kidnaps:

Al-Qaeda, drug traffic alliance threatens Sahel security (Magharebia.com)


It sure doesn't look promising....

José



Al-Qaeda, drug traffic alliance threatens Sahel security

2010-01-08

Three men from Mali, with alleged links to a rebel group from South America, were recently arrested in Ghana and flown to the United States to face trial. Many Maghreb observers, however, are feeling repercussions from the international criminal case much closer to home.
Oumar Issa, Harouna Touré and Idriss Abelrahman are accused of conspiring to finance al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operations by transporting drugs. According to the US indictment announced on December 19th, the Malians agreed to help the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) move Europe-bound cocaine from Ghana to the North African desert.
But their South American contacts were not members of the al-Qaeda linked Colombian rebel group that uses Africa as a drug-trafficking gateway to Europe; they were US intelligence agents.
"The involvement of al-Qaeda in the drugs trade does not come as a surprise," Maghreb affairs expert Nasr El Din Ben Hadid told Magharebia. "They adopt the principle of 'the ends justify the means'."
"The fact that terrorist groups have resorted to the trafficking of drugs is an open secret," agreed Amine Kirem, an Algerian researcher on Islamic movements.
"Investigations carried out by the special services in Algeria have highlighted a very close relationship between terrorist groups and drug barons," he explained, adding that terrorists are using the illegal drug trade to buy weapons and explosives.
"During the 1990s, these groups had the money they needed to fund their activities. This is no longer the case," Kirem said.
Desperate circumstances are prompting desperate measures, according to Algerian security expert Elias Boukeraa.
"Having been beaten politically and militarily, terrorists in the Sahel are trying to bounce back by creating more armed cells within this vast region. These groups are exploiting the poor socioeconomic situation and armed conflicts in an attempt to re-establish themselves," he said.
The region must now face a "confirmed" link between terrorist groups and drug-trafficking networks, former Malian Defence Minister Soumeylou Maiga Boubey told an Algiers conference on December 28th.
"Mafia activity, the trafficking of drugs and arms and kidnappings are all methods used by these groups," he said.
"To say that the danger is far away from our borders and shirk our responsibilities is to make a huge mistake. Terrorism poses a serious threat to stability and peace in the region," the former minister added.
North Africa, the Sahel/Sahara region and the whole of West Africa are particularly affected by the problem, said Moroccan security and terrorism expert Mohammed Benhemmou.
"Over the past few years we have witnessed a change in the routes by which drugs are trafficked, from Latin America, via West Africa and across the desert towards the target markets, taking advantage of the failure of certain countries to monitor what is going on in their territory," he said.
Morocco, according to a source within the Ministry of the Interior, has long been aware of the activities of terrorist organisations and the ways by which they are financed. The government is therefore implementing anti-money laundering laws and other initiatives targeting organised crime and drug trafficking.
But terrorism cannot be defeated by one country alone, Benhemmou pointed out: "Even though the ends of drug trafficking and terrorism are not the same, since the former is done for financial gain and the latter for political, the two activities assist one another."
Even if Morocco steps up checks along its borders and inside its own territory, neighbourly relations in the region are fragile and a high degree of co-operation is required if goals are to be reached, the expert said.
To this end, Arab states are co-ordinating efforts to dry out funding resources for terror operations. Last September, the Secretariat-General of the Council of Interior Ministers endorsed a three-year plan to implement a unified Arab strategy for combating illegal drugs and the related issue of money-laundering.
Algerian expert Boukeraa proposed going even further, suggesting to Magharebia that all countries in the region should consider creating a combined army to overcome the threat. Pan-Arab initiatives against drug-related crimes and states' focus on internal security, however, are not the whole story, argued Lahcen Daoudi, an MP for Morocco's Party of Justice and Development.
"Whether we're talking about terrorism or drug trafficking, we have to look inwards to find the root causes," he said. "Why do people become terrorists or drug traffickers? We need to know the reasons underpinning it so that we can do something about them. One way of doing that is take action in schools."
Beyond discussions of regional security concerns, Maghreb counter-terrorism strategies and social projects to stem the problem at its source, some people question the sheer incongruity of terrorists who claim faith but use drug trafficking as a source of income.
"This is a crime against ethics, human rights, and religion, a crime against Islam, because the fatwa they use to justify such crimes take place under the banner of Islam," said Sami Burham, a Tunisia-based expert on Islamic groups.
"I think they justified their selling of drugs on the basis of a fatwa that permitted Muslims to sell alcohol to non-Muslims," Burham added. "Terrorists use the same logic to rob money from non-Muslims to finance jihad, because according to that fatwa, non-Muslims have no sanctity."
Drugs are also being used to lure the next generation of terrorists.
According to Salim Ahmed, an Algerian journalist who specialises in security issues, the failure of "extremist religious" arguments has spurred these groups to seek new ways of operating and recruiting new members.
"Young people no longer believe promises that they will go to heaven. It was necessary to find another way of recruiting them to commit acts of violence," Ahmed said. "Drugs are one such method." promising
Indeed, he said, "several suicide bombers have acted under the influence of drugs".
"People who have slit infants' throats, raped women, killed themselves or blown themselves up cannot have been in full control of their senses," he concluded.

Olá José de Brito,

thank you for this document.
Drug traffic or/and weak central power of poor countries? That's what is all about?

Rui Pedro.
Castro Verde - Alentejo

Hi,

In a nutshell, I would say yes!

The Sahara has always been a land of business, smuggling, and assaults. The mixture between Islamic fundamentalists and smugglers is only an extension of a “traditional” way of living. Of course it doesn’t bring any good for independent travelling, but it never did in the past anyway… The generally weak Sahelian governments may not be able to detain the creation of a new “narco-Sahara” country (resembling a bit Colombia…), in comparison with the tighter and more powerful Mediterranean governments. I don’t want (nor wish!) to sound pessimistic, but I see the current situation as something that will tend to last for the next decade or so….

Cheers,
José

Three voluntary workers of a Spanish NGO were kidnapped in Mauritania to 170 kms of the capital.

It is very possible that were kidnapped by Tuaregs, since the sale of drug and the traffic of weapon to what the tuaregs were devoting themselves this one very chased(prosecuted) by the government of Mauritania, for what the Tuaregs, they have decided to kidnap western them to sell to Al Qaeda and to extract money with his sale.

Hello,

two interesting articles
Original: Afrique Hebdo - Voisinage conflictuel : Que se passe-t-il entre l’Algérie et le Mali ?

Englisch: Gogoonisch - E
____________________

Le Pays - Les terroristes rient sous cape

Gogoonisch E

Regards

Ulrich

By the way: If the community means I should stop writing, tell me.

"By the way: If the community means I should stop writing, tell me."

Hi Ulrich, speaking only for myself, I appreciate your posts. Please keep it up!
Kobus

Ditto
 

Hi Ulrich,

Keep going. The world is constantly changing, North Africa in particular - the more accurate information we have, the better.

Happy trails,

Jojo

Hi Ulrich
Ditto. Information that's potentially useful to a traveller, up to date and relevant, it is very welcome.

People who aren't interested are able to choose not to read it.

Rgds
Chris

I think the message was they want you to write more, not less ;)

I also find it handy to have updated information at hand in a few threads here.

Hello,

analysis and factbox for Al-Qaeda's Sahara wing
Reuters - ANALYSIS-Qaeda fuels security, criminal woes in Sahara states

Reuters - FACTBOX-Al Qaeda's Sahara wing

Regards

Ulrich

And this:
Source: Urgent :Arrestation de deux combattants d’Al-Qaïda aux environs de Zouerate

Ulrich

Among other things the Reuters factbox states the situation "...has also created a market for freelance gunmen to seize foreigners, who are then passed on to the Islamists."

I suppose he's carefully not suggesting it has ever happened, but earlier reports have parroted the existence of these 'inverted bounty hunters'. To me it sounds most unlikely but has the advantage of making the area look more dangerous then it really is - always a good twist with news from dodgy countries.

There is a big difference between AQIM possibly outsourcing a grab (still unlikely IMO) and, as the article suggests, opportunist gangs roaming around the Sahel looking for targets to grab and deliver to AQIM for whatever they'll pay. I suspect AQIM is far better organised and sophisticated to allow that.

Ch

If we have six people kidnapped out of the tens of thousands of westerners passing through every year, the risk is still near nil. And with so few incidents, there can't be a number of gangs roaming around looking for targets.
But mustn't there be some level of cooperation when they can get the laissez-passer all the way from the coast to east Mali?

A side-note, I was driving around with my Mauretanian friend in south Burkina couple weeks ago. He is Peul, so lean and tall. When he donned his black chesh and yellow sun-glasses, locals started yelling "terrorist!" after him!
They must've seen the pics on television or perhaps in the papers, with a Burkina woman being held hostage, so they are aware of what a terrorist presumably looks like.
Like a "Tuareg", eh?

some level of cooperation...

With these guys' reputation in Mori I would see it more as intimidation - and even then there aren't that many people you need to intimidate if they took the route some of us speculated they did. And from the ANI report above it's possible they had comrades (fuel?) in Zouerate.

Once past there, there are two easily avoided army bases in Mori east of Guelb (and one abandoned one I think), and nothing in north Mali apart from, I presume, Tessalit and Kidal.

Ch

AQIM has postet an statement for the in Mauretania arrestet terrorists on an islamic webside.

http://www.desert-info.ch/download/p...rum/banner.jpg

Sorry for the smilies, they come from the translation

Regards

Ulrich

Ulrich, I must confess to me the above message doesn't hold any intelligible content, translated or not.

The deadlines are getting closer, four days left for Camatte (Feb 20). For the Italians, March 2. Kouchner was back in Bamako trying to persuade president Touré. The Spaniards seem to be on their way to freedom after ransom of 5M USD was paid.
For the French and the Italians, no ransom has been mentioned, only release of prisoners. Does this mean that the Spaniards are held by MBM (the businessman) and the others by Abou Zeid (the ideologue)?

AFP: French foreign minister in Mali as hostage deadline nears

edit
I guess this is what the above message is about
" Nouakchott - A leader of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has called on al-Qaeda prisoners in Mauritania to rejoin the group in its desert strongholds. Abdelrahman al-Tandaghi, also known as "Abu Anas al-Shanqiti," called on the prisoners to re-link with the organization and take up "jihad" in a video released by AQIM's media arm.
The call comes as groups of Mauritanian intellectuals claim they have made strides in their government-sanctioned efforts to convince captured al-Qaeda militants to renounce "extremist thought" and violence.
The efforts are part of the government's new strategy to combat extremism through education."

Read more: Al-Qaeda seeks to lure back 'reformed' militants in Mauritania : Africa World

... Does this mean that the Spaniards are held by MBM (the businessman) and the others by Abou Zeid (the ideologue)?

Good way of summing it up. I wonder if that's how it is. Abou Zaid seems like a real figure, but over the years I've lost track of whether MBM exists or not.

Ch

yes, like that it is! MBM, now for 3 - 5 years married with a mauritanien tuareg woman and so under the protection of the womans tribe, holds the Spaniards.

Ulrich

Hi Ulrich, yes I heard that story too.
Would she not be a Berabish or do you consider that the same thing as Tuareg (as some like to do - not so sure myself).
It seems the Berabish call the shots down there.

Ch

Who is a Tuareg?
 

As tuaregs are often held responsible for every bad incident in the desert, it would be good to know - who are they?

From my limited knowledge, there are no tuaregs in Morocco or Mauretania. There are¨sahrawi, maures and various bedouin tribes (sometimes in Mali called Berabish).
In Morocco there were berber in the desert wearing blue, but I doubt they were really tuaregs, even as they insisted...same thing in Tunisia.

edit: even in this very thread you find those tired unsubstantiated generalisations:
"It is very possible that were kidnapped by Tuaregs, since the sale of drug and the traffic of weapon to what the tuaregs were devoting themselves this one very chased(prosecuted) by the government of Mauritania, for what the Tuaregs, they have decided to kidnap western them to sell to Al Qaeda and to extract money with his sale."
Tuareg = desert dwelling bandit

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...uareg_area.png
Tuareg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Volkswagen owns the trademark, that much I know.

Since Chris did this lovely map why not check it out at

Kidnappings in the Sahara since 2003
http://www.sahara-overland.com/routes/kidnapmap.jpg

If there is a pattern, I can't see it. Other than that the bad guys wanted to demonstrate that they could strike anywhere.

Reuters - Algeria recalls envoy from Mali over Qaeda row

Ulrich

First comments are coming back from Monsieur Camatte following his release. Nothing we don't already know (isolation, bad food, bad water, tough times). Also mentioned in the article is a commitment from France to help Mali in a campaign against AQ-IM. If they are going to succeed, they'd better get a move on. Two weeks ago the French announced that they were closing their military base in Senegal, one of three main military bases that the French have in the Sahel. Perhaps they might redeploy in Mali?

France backs Mali in anti-terror fight: News24: Africa: News

L'Expression - Al Qaîda rebondit et renfloue ses caisses

Gogoonisch - E

Ulrich

I was surprised to hear Monsieur Camatte labelled as a French agent. The evidence wasn't strong, but then such agents are not normally identified, even by mistake. From the French perspective, there is value in claiming that he is an agent, even if he isn't. AQ-IM are now constrained to assume that they have been compromised - that their comings and goings, their approximate location, their day to day routine and the kind of backup (including kit) that they have to hand are known to a specialist. Taken from this perspective, kidnapping is a risky business for AQ-IM.

OTOH if Aqim had known he was a spy they would surely have let us know, as it would somewhat justify their kidnapping.
Who is a spy? A full-time agent working under cover, or perhaps someone who occasionally has provided information to the SS while he was plying his trade (such as looking for a natural malaria treatment)? He was allegedly named as an agent by one of his superiors, but question remains what that means.

True -I agree. But this doesn't really alter the point that AQ-IM *now* have to consider the fact that they may have had someone in camp who was trained to evaluate them. We can expect that all those who have been freed in the past have been questioned by intelligence. If not, then why not? The intelligence one gets from a trained person would be better.

AP - Al-Qaida growing in strength and numbers in Africa

Ulrich

Algeria Travel Advice
 

Damn, didnt notice before but now the British FCO say no travel at all south of Arak (on the TSH between In Salah and Tam)....frustrating!

Algeria travel advice

^ They changed the advice back to beng okay almost as soon as I wrote that last post! Great news:

Algeria travel advice

rfi - Hostage-taking - should you pay?

Ulrich

Ennahar - Abu Zeid agrees to ensure the safety of the French in the Sahel

Ulrich

Africom in Gao
 

Was this recent military exercise kept quiet? Do people think the Americans are taking the AQIM threat more seriously?

AFRICOM Photo Gallery

Dave, the Americans have had a very visible presence in Gao for years now,
This hasn't had much if any effect on what is going on in the surrounding desert as far as I can tell.
American opinion is as usual divided between those who would like to move in and "clean up the mess" (Cheney style) and those who don't give a damn.
The French are playing dirty games like always, as per the above article.

Recent development probably means a setback for any effort to improve the situation and eliminate the AQ threat.
Gulf Times – Qatar’s top-selling English daily newspaper - Opinion
"The capacity for military co-operation against Al Qaeda cells operating in North Africa has been undermined by a coup in Niger last month and rising tensions between governments in the region.....
The capacity of Western nations to fill any widening of the Saharan security gap due to regional diplomatic tensions may also be undermined by deepening mistrust between them and the North African states.
Algeria, a regional counter-terrorism powerhouse, has accused France of orchestrating Mali’s prisoner swap to save hostage Pierre Camatte, and has also resisted Western pressure to pursue AQIM beyond its borders.
“The way the French hostage has been released is a dangerous setback in the fight against Al Qaeda in the Sahel,” said retired Colonel Ahmed Adimi on Algerian state television. “The visit of (French President) Sarkozy to Mali is in itself a victory for Al Qaeda,” he added.
The prospect of increased Al Qaeda activity in the Sahara could hurt tourism revenues in places like Niger and Mali which, according to the World Tourism Organisation, rely on sightseers for more than 4% of their respective GDPs.
“The dollar figures are fairly negligible, but as a percentage of GDP they are extremely high,” said Porter.
Tuareg rebels active in Niger and Mali have begun cooperating with Al Qaeda cells in recent months because they are able to make more money through ransoms and drug trafficking than they could from their share of tourism revenues, according to security experts. — Reuters"

^ Makes for a depressing read.

Is it fair to say that Northern Mali is AQIMs main sphere of influence? Do people think Niger and Mauritania will soon find themselves in the same situation?

Sorry if this sounds ignorant, but it seems to me that AQIM have entrenched themselves in northern Mali and from there launch raids over the borders into Mauritania and Niger.

Are there any articles which suggest AQIM have bases in Niger, or do they simply work with disgruntled Tuaregs? From what ive read it appears that AQIM grab what they can in Niger and get back over into Mali as quickly as possible.....seems like they dont like hanging around in Niger for too long.

I suppose one issue for AQIM with regards the threat to Niger is that the capital Niamey is so close to the Mali/Niger border (well, in camparison to Nouakchott Mauritania being close to the Mali border).....is is possible that AQIM worry about a swifter mobilisation of Nigers security forces to try and catch them? Or is that just wishful thinking on my part?!

Do people think that with the military junta overseeing a transition period back to civilian rule (InSha'Allah) things for Niger (with regards the AQIM threat) will improve or deteriorate?

Curious what people think.

In reply to DTH-

I reckon AQ-IM are in NE Mali because:
1) it is possible to live there (i.e. remote, but has water + topography to get in amongst and hide)
2) they now have good connections in the region
3) the Mali army is inept - certainly more so than Mauri, Alg or Niger.

What about the military govt in Niger? For the moment they have their diary full with running the country, so they are not expected to be out hunting tigers as well. BUT if they decide to, then I think they would be more effective than if they (as military) were acting on instructions from politicians. Any war is slowed down when managed by a cabinet. If the military run the country, v.quick operational decisions can be made. The trouble is other countries (notably Mauri and Algeria) can't mount unilateral rades into NE Mali without either the advanced permission of Mali or some kind of comeback on them. In this sense AQ-IM have got their tactics right. Algeria must be busting to take their Mi-24s over the border and hose down AQ-IM. Check out Google Earth - you'll see 4 choppers (prob MI-17s) on the apron at Bodj Mokhtar, 7 km or so from the border.

Le Matin - Paris et Washington vont-ils intervenir au Sahel ?

Gogoonisch - E

Ulrich

Tahalil Hebdo - Sept pays condamnent prises d’otages et paiement de rançons

Gogoonisch - E

Ulrich

AQIM Renews Threat
 

:(

AQIM renews threats, urges jihad (Magharebia.com)

Droukdel possibly out as leader of AQIM
 

Interesting read.

Droukdel possibly out as leader of AQIM (Magharebia.com)

... a prominent member of [AQIM?] had surrendered several days ago to security services [at] a province on the border with Niger, before being transferred last week to Algiers where he made very serious statements about the dealings of the leaders of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and the French intelligence services.

This post by Ulrich a few days ago (actual link here now) seems to have slipped by without much comment apart from 'dirty tricks'.

...following the dealings of ... Abu Zeid with French intelligence and particularly after the French campaign against Islam, including the latest against the Islamic veil..

Abu Z ...succeeded in 2006 to establish channels of contact through a foreigner who was working in the field of oil in Hassi Messaoud...

it "...reveals the existence of direct contacts between leaders of the organization, and French intelligence agents (DGA) to enable the French military to be informed about the situation in the Sahel region".

How cozy! Are we expected to believe that AZ was having discussions with France about the ethics of of suppressing the hijab and at the same time keeping them abreast of its ops?

Then again, AFAICT, DGA is the weapons procurement arm of the French MoD, rather than an Mi5-type organisation.
I think ennahar might have meant: DGSE

Anyone want to attempt an explanation (excluding 'tunnels') - I've gone a bit thick. It makes you suspect that ennaharonline might be a DZ state mouthpiece incorporating an anti-French agenda. Or just lazy journos? Some ennaharonline articles look a bit sensational.


There is also a small 'where not to go' map on Ennaharonline with this article (which otherwise doesnt say much).

It's not quite how I might have drawn it; the Fezzan looks especially dodgy!

Ch

I have to say, I also don't understand the article that Chris Scott discussed in the previous posting. It makes very little sense to me.

I do think I understand the map - including the dodgy Fezzan shading. It looks to me that the map simply links all the points where kidnappings have happened to NE Mali by means of thick shaded corridors. The Fezzan shading comes about because of the kidnapping of the Austrains in Tunisia. They were transported down the Algerian/Libyan border and for that event, the map earns a large shaded corridor in E Algeria and W Libya. It is no real guide to where the next events will happen.

It looks to me that the map simply links all the points where kidnappings have happened to NE Mali by means of thick shaded corridors...

Well if it means to show that then it does so pretty badly too IMO, assuming it was drawn to accompany the article and following kidnappings 3, 4, 6 and 7 (as shown on the kidnapping map pictured earlier in the thread). And how does north Nigeria fit - other than a place of sectarian violence involving Muslims?

Overall though the map is nothing to get too steamed up about.
Private security consultants get paid a lot more to produce less accurate info.

Ch

In a news conference, Mr Gaddafi called on Libyans currently fighting in Algeria and in the deserts of Mali to lay down their arms, saying they could come back to Libya as free people and reintegrate as productive citizens.

BBC News - Libya frees more than 200 Islamist prisoners

Ennahar claims to actually be the "first independent daily" in Algeria. Run by two journalists, a private enterprise, no state connection.
But their reporting raises suspicions. The spaniard/israeli who disappeared in Hassi Messoud has been reported first hand only by Ennahar, and their "corroborative source" seems to be the only one?
And this Mossad agent is said to have been smuggled into the country by an Egyptian company owned by a coptic Egyptian businessman. So they are suggesting a plot involving jews and christian Egyptians? Hmm.
And the reporting of AQ training camps in the Israeli desert is, well - it is still on the "most popular" list.
I would have marked the Gao-Menaka region in Mali bright red.

From the Algiers conference, there may be some results. A wider French and US involvement (perhaps this is how Kouchner persuaded the Malians to set four prisoners free - - - one wonders what else they promised).
Air surveillance and bombing from airstrips in the Mali desert. And a US Africom base in Tam??
North Africans mull anti-Qaida airstrikes - UPI.com

maliweb - Espace sahélo-saharien : Mandat d’arrêt de Nouakchott contre un chef salafiste

Gogoonisch - E

Ulrich

'Several Western states' need to do some homework about insurgencies! If we know bombing is a tactic, so does AQ-IM. The simple response is to divide into small groups. Bombing groups of 3 people doesn't make sense. For the tactics to be effective you'd need to bomb first and then talk about it in the press. Not the other way round!

Yes, I spotted the rather pointed 'Coptic' ref too.

Re: the US Africom base in Tam. As we know there is a nearly finished installation there just north of the airport but with no exclusive runway.

I read a few documents by a US Saharan counter-terrorist specialist Lianne Kennedy-Boudali the other night (2 from 2007 on Welcome to the Combating Terrorism Center, and one Senate testimonial from 2009) in which she suggests people, including locals, assumed the installation was for Africom because it was being built by Brown & Root (Halliburton subsidiaries?), when in fact it was for the Algies. (Construction stopped amid corruption allegations not unlike those plaguing Sonatrach at the moment). You do wonder why the Algies could not build this themselves unless it is super hi-tech and was built in return for oil and gas concessions.

Of course writing for West Point might cast doubt on LHB's impartiality, but nothing else I read in her docs looked like it had a hawkish agenda. She seemed rather rational and coherant, especially about the move from GSPC to AQIM as well as predicting Droukal's shaky position which seems to have come to pass according to Dave's post above.

Regarding the French engineers building new? air strips in north Mali. You wonder why bother, they have all the all-weather runway they need at Bordj Moktar, the same at Agadez (both just 600km from the near-Menaka 'Red Zone'), and a mile long strip at Chegga (all in 'safer' Alg, Niger and Mori respectively).

Perhaps part of the deal is Mali gets improved runways at Tessalit and especially Kidal and nice new airstrips elsewhere to better control the area in the future.


Maybe this is has been said already but the more I think and read the more I feel there are two separate 'narco-Salafist' groups out there in north Mali:

MBM (whose latest arrest warrant Ulrich has announced above) based somewhere in the Taoudenni region for many many years - good for fast smuggling routes. Notably MBM never joined up with the re-branded AQIM and long before this all started was seen as purely a crim-businessman and even a Robin Hood figure (who has also been killed/arrested several times/retired to Togo/blamed for the falling £/got an amnesty/surrendered/works for the DRS/does not exist at all).

And hardcore AQIM Abou Zaid down to the southeast, north of Menaka, where most hostages have been/are being kept, including unfortunate Edwin Dyer. Definitely exists and not a Robin Hood figure.

all idle speculation of course...

Ch

If the campaign is planned around fighter/bombers (like Mig23) then 600km is probably too far (response time too slow, fuel/range a problem) and dirt strips like at Chenachen (not Chegga?) are too short and the wrong surface for the Migs. That said, a bombing campaign is misguided. Better to base it round some Mi-24 choppers (easy to refuel anywhere on the ground, easy to chase targets on the ground and with appropriate kit on board). Butterfly tactics work well (chopper one stands 10 minutes off), chopper two flits around, lands here and there to draw attention and when the attention finally arrives, chopper one joins the party. Its worked well elsewhere. Bombing runs, by comparison, are more miss than hit.

"(not Chegga?)"
Added by Ch: There is a 1.5-km airstrip 4.6km west of Chegga fort, but as you say, big helicopters better.
Added by RW: 4.6-km east of Chegga fort?

Howz about drones? The americans are starting to us them in Somalia, and also targeted killings.

I heard that Alg are blocking transport of water and commodities to Tessalit region - could this be at all effective? Evidently it has been a successful tactic in pacifying the south, controlling water and fuel.
But the border is huge and there is enough water in Tessalit, no?

maliweb - Enquêtes sur le terrorisme sahelo-saharien : Au cœur de l’empire salafiste

Gogoonisch - E

maliweb - La métastase Belmokhtar

Gogoonisch - E

Ulrich

Both interesting articles from Ulrich from a Malian POV.

Of MBM they say the ...man is credited with all the powers, starting with the gift of ubiquity. You see him everywhere at the same time, Blida, Algeria, Tedjerert Mali, Mauritania Alegh, Agadez in Niger... A sort of Lucky Luke in turbans...

but this time they speculate the game could be up for him.

Ch

DW - Diplomatic row threatens Western-backed alliance in the Sahel against al Qaeda

Ulrich

[url=http://www.maliweb.net/category.php?NID=59023&intr]maliweb.net :: Axe Bamako- Nouakchott : Un bataillon militaire mauritanien d

maliweb - Axe Bamako- Nouakchott : Un bataillon militaire mauritanien déployé �* la frontière malienne :thumbup1:

Institut Thomas Moore - Towards a sustainable security in the Maghreb: an opportunity for the region, a commitment for the European Union

The complete report:

The special report in PDF (28 pages), 1009 KB---------------------->http://www.desert-info.ch/download/pdf/Icons/PDF.jpg
________________

truthout - Guantánamo and Habeas Corpus: The Torture Victim and the Taliban Recruit

Ulrich

Washington is preparing to establish a military base in Burkina Faso

Algeria reservation to participate in exercises in the Atlantic coast

El Khabar

FP - Morocco's Misguided War on Terror

Ulrich

Grenade attack in Gao, Mali:

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