Here's how they spent some of the ransom money.

‘We don't want to become a second Afghanistan' - The Globe and Mail

"The insurgents had night-vision goggles, bulletproof vests and rocket-propelled grenades. The soldiers carried amulets and Koranic verses for protection. They were also outnumbered 3 to 1. Two hours later, almost half of the 60 soldiers were dead, and the rest were fleeing for their lives."

clearly no one is going to be able to get hold of a piece of paper which proves US-Algerian involvement in the kidnappings in 2003. And even if that piece of paper existed and was found, its authenticity would be quickly denied. So I understand why you asked the question Roman. The problem I have with Keenan's argument is that his proof rests with the argument that is was convenient for US + Algeria to get involved together - that mutual rewards would flow from their collusion. It is a huge leap to go from this convenience of outcome to claiming that there was actually direct collusion in making that outcome happen. And second problem I have with Keenan is that he makes no distinction between these huge leaps and simple real fact. So the US involvement in the kidnapping is presented by him in quite the same terms as the fact that Obama was elected as President. And the trouble with this is that he comes across as ungrounded and eccentric.

He needs to make a distinction between the leaps of faith and the real facts. There are inconsistencies in the kidnappings in 2003 which are quite pointed and revealing and these suggest certain things. The more we focus on inconsistencies and trying to understand them, the clearer the picture that will eventually emerge. I think that's what I meant by evidence.

Could well be
but Mauritania has done slightly more to clamp down on Aqim than Mali has
after the French family was attacked just before xmas 2007
the president and the imams were all denouncing violence
they have a good number of suspects behind bars
AFP: Mauritanian Al-Qaeda detainees renounce extremism

some of these guys may well be not guilty of more than associating with Aqim - which is natural since they are intermarrying and establishing themselves in the Mali desert for a decade or more now.

AQ can get about anywhere as we know but as for bases, I agree with priffe's assessment - they prefer to be in far north Mali. Even before it all kicked off the Mori army had bases up at Gallouiya and even way out at Chegga - + that patrol that got done at Tourine. So FWIW the army is up there (and often paying the price...)
Setting aside the supposed infiltration mentioned on the Globe report, what has the Mali army got based up north? Tessalit maybe? Apart from the army/militia raids mentioned (where we read they're so fatigued from the chase they rest up before the attack - and consequently get wiped out!) there is no great risk of resistance in north Mali.
I also suspect the FN Mali terrain is easier to get around on fast; it's been a contrabanders corridor for years. The big band of the Ourane erg in east Mori makes a speedy north-south transit difficult and I believe most wells north of Ouarane are occupied by nomads and close to those Mori bases.

When we crossed this area in 2006 (heading Mori-Mali-Alg) it was notable that the first track we saw after Richat was once we crossed into Mali days later - a clear piste ran N-S soon after the border but well before the salt piste (and not on any map of course).

While GSPC/AQIM have certainly raided into east Mori, based on all my conjecture I cant see them being based there, assuming that is what is being discussed.

Ch

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Morocco Overland 4 (2025) • Trans Morocco Trail

Interesting discussion this.

This is what we seem to agree on:
1) N Mali is hot at the moment
2) AQ-M have their bases in N Mali and have settled in
3) its *objectively* the most dangerous place to go to, esp at the moment

This is where I seem to differ:
1) I expect that AQ-M won't make their next kidnapping in N Mali
2) I expect instead that they will make a move in Mauri

I'm sticking my neck out and given time we will be able to tell either way.

This is why I think N Mali is not the next place for an event to happen:
1) Its getting more difficult for AQ-M to operate in N Mali.
The US is donating kit:
BBC NEWS | Africa | US arms Mali to battle al-Qaeda
and so is Algeria:
Algeria and Mali Join Hands in Combating Terror
2) AQ-M have always been quite versatile and unpredictable with their hits. Who would have thought Tunisia was somewhere you'd be kidnapped and taken to N Mali? Not me. Thinking N Mali is thinking that AQ-M are predictable. To me, their record shows that they like to spread things around.
3) there's lots more tourists going through Mauri than N Mali - easy pickings.

The weakness in this argument are:
1) the water problem in E Mauri which Chris has pointed out and which may well be crucial + distance and terrain
2) the Mauri army may be better than Malian army - I just don't know - priffe has argued thet are.
3) N Mali is very convenient and this convenience might be worth making a stand for.

In the end we are all second guessing what AQ-M want - what they like the most. If they stay in Mali and have a scrap with the Mali army, then its a scrap with Mali that they're after. I don't have any proof for this, but my hunch is that they'd prefer not to have a conventional scrap. Perhaps I'm wrong but scrapping with Malian troops doesnt seem to fit ideologically or with their history. The only reason it seems to happen is that the Malian troops aren't leaving AQ-M alone in N Mali. Given enough heat from the Malian army, I think AQ-M are likely to find somewhere else.

Anyone got any feel for what was going down west of Serouenout with Alibaba? Any AQ-M reading this that can give us a heads-up? (And BTW my real name is Indiana Jones and I've retired to Pitcairn Island).

Could someone remind perhaps - any kidnappings at all took place in N Mali recently?

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https://famous-walker.dreamwidth.org - in Russian but with lots of photos

none - but some on the Mali-Niger border. On the other hand, 3 separate parties (4 if you include 2003) ended up in N Mali. So the assumption is that if you go strolling through the lions den, you'll get eaten.

To clarify: no one's ever been grabbed in north Mali as virtually no one goes there (same as east Mori north of Nema, IMO). But wherever you're grabbed by them in the Sahara, you seem to end up in north Mali -that is Mali well north of Timbuktu.

That BBC report ends with: "... He says the gift from the US and talk of co-operation with other countries in the region may mean the battle is about to begin in earnest..."

Good luck to them. It may explain the (mostly successful) Algerian army attacks on AQIM bands in the Grand Erg Occidental region lately. It could be interpreted as AQIM fleeing north Mali back to NE Alg to sit it out/step up local mayhem.

Ch

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Morocco Overland 4 (2025) • Trans Morocco Trail

I wouldn't place a bet on where the next incident will take place. After the Tunisia kidnapping, it appears it could happen almost anywhere
If there hasn't been many kidnappings in Mali desert, one reason could be that there aren't that many tourists around to kidnap.
We somewhat reluctantly went through Kidal region in May, and it did feel strange being there while not far away there were westerners held for ransom.

If you read the above article, I think it shows how poorly trained, motivated and equipped the Malian army is. A posse was sent out from Timbuktu after the colonel was assassinated. This was a local militia that were angry because one of their leaders was murdered. They tracked down and killed a number of AQIM rebels. Then the Malian army took over the operation and it became a disaster.
I think the US (and Algerians) may be able to train and equip the Mali soldiers, but will they ever be motivated to fight in the hostile desert?

Bamako is far away and they don't seem to care much about Aqim - very different response when the rebels are touaregs looking for autonomy.

What Bamako should do is set up a division of touaregs to defend the desert, armed to the teeth and trained by the best ;o)

49 sentenced to death in Algeria.
Ennahar Online - Capital punishment in absentia for Droukdal and 48 defendants
Among them yet again Abdelmalek Droukdel.
Death sentences are not carried out in Algeria, but they may serve to make amnesty seem more palatable.
Droukdel showed weakness seeking support from the mufti
Al-Qaeda's Droukdel seeks religious support for terrorism (Magharebia.com)

What is the true relationship between Aqim desert and Aqim north? Same guys?
Sorry if I am straying OT.

Another news story out today from the BBC


BBC NEWS | Programmes | From Our Own Correspondent | New realities for ancient Timbuktu

Article on the BBC website:

BBC NEWS | Programmes | From Our Own Correspondent | New realities for ancient Timbuktu

R

Lotsa guys listening to the beeb...

Here's a recent congressional hearing dealing solely with the Aqim and desert security. I'd say it shows US sensitivity to the situation at hand. And there is no talk about kidnapping foreigners in collaboration with the Algerian government to achieve....huh, what was it now again mr Keenan?

Opening Remarks for Hearing on Counterterrorism in Africa (Sahel Region)
One-Clip Player (BETA)
"The United States can play a helpful supporting role in the regional effort, but we must avoid taking actions that could unintentionally increase local tensions
or lend credibility to AQIM’s claims of legitimacy. First and foremost, we must be sensitive to local political dynamics and avoid precipitous actions which exacerbate long-standing and often bloody conflicts.
AQIM’s ideology and violent tactics are antithetical to the vast majority of people in the region and the group’s ability to mobilize significant popular support for its objectives has been largely frustrated. It has failed to build and sustain meaningful alliances with insurgencies and criminal networks operating in the region. In fact, AQIM’s murder of a Malian military officer this summer, the unprecedented execution of a British hostage, and the murder of an American citizen in Mauritania may have caused some groups in Northern Mali to sever opportunistic economic arrangements occasionally established to supplement local groups’ efforts to survive in the region’s austere environment. By contrast, the perceptions of the United States have been generally favourable throughout the Sahel, even during periods when our popularity around the world declined. It is instructive that a 2008 poll involving 18 Muslim countries revealed that Mauritanians had the highest opinion of the United States.

The countries in the region continue to demonstrate the political will to combat terrorism and trans-national crime. They have explicitly stated that the Sahel’s security is the responsibility of the countries in the region. They have not asked the United States to take on a leadership role in counterterrorism efforts and have, in fact, clearly signalled that a more visible or militarily proactive posture by the United States would be counterproductive. We fully concur that the appropriate roles for the United States and other third countries with even more significant interests in the region must be to support regional security efforts while continuing to provide meaningful development assistance to the more remote areas. Moreover, we have emphasized that while the United States will do its part, the burden must be shared.

We recognize, however, that the security environment in the Sahel requires sustained attention to address a wide range of vulnerabilities and capacity deficits. There is insufficient capacity to monitor and protect immense swaths of largely ungoverned or poorly governed territory. The arid northern half of Mali alone covers an area larger than Texas. Niger is the poorest country in the world according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Mauritania and Mali rank near the bottom of the Human Development Index scale.
The vulnerability of the northern Sahel has not only led AQIM to seek out safe-havens in the region, but has also enabled the operations of a range of trans-national criminal networks. Criminal traffickers in human beings, weapons, and narcotics also exploit parts of the region. West Africa has emerged as a major trans-shipment area for cocaine flowing from South America to Europe. Narco-trafficking poses a direct threat to U.S. interests since the proceeds of cocaine trafficked through the region generally flow back to Latin American organizations moving drugs to the United States.
...
Although AQIM’s attempts to recruit in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel have been largely unsuccessful, its limited successes in countries such as Mauritania can largely be traced to its ability to capitalize on the frustration among the young over insufficient educational or vocational opportunities. AQIM has also attracted recruits and material support from isolated communities or neighbourhoods in Mauritania and elsewhere that lack alternatives to schools, media or networking centers that promote violent extremism."

Hi priffe,
I don't like Jeremy Keenan cause he is a bullshit speaker. But one thing he wrote is correct. The Algerian government was the initiator of our kidnapping of 2003. This fact is true.

2007, after General Lamaris dead, he was the chief of the DRS, El Watan, a news paper which is normally the "speaker" for the government, wrote in an article that Lamari, respective Algerian authorities have been behind our kidnapping.

Regards

Ulrich

Involved, probably, but who and to what extent?
Algeria remains a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.