Mali north of Gao and Timbuktu is the short answer to the question of where not to go.

Depressingly, incidents over the last few years has shown that you can encounter these AQIM guys anywhere between Nouakchott and Tunisia.

Behaviour is important. It was pointed out to us by the locals last trip that we were hanging around Tamanrasset area for too long (11 days, involuntarily), and that people were talking. Our guide told everyone we were going to Mali over Tin Zahouatine, Then we went over Timiaouine instead.
We encountered people in the Mali desert that could be best described as "Arab businessmen". The guide said after they left that they would now be on their cell phones making our presence known.
No reason to be paranoid, but every reason to be cautious.
Contrary to some list members, I don't think it adds to the excitement of being in the desert.

Did you change plans because the guide had made your route too well known or was this change part of the plan that your guide was aware of?

Back in November 2001 we were two bikes going from Djanet to Tam.
This was shortly after USA invaded Afghanistan and the rumors said that AQ had established training camps north of Djanet.

When we passed the fort in Serouenout we were stopped and the army asked a lot more questions then they usually do. They were very interesting in where we were going and where we would camp.
Anyway, we passed the fort and continued driving. Directly before it got dark we left the piste to camp. Since we hadn’t seen people for the entire and it was getting dark we parked pretty close to the piste.
After a few hours we saw the lights from a car approaching slowly. The piste is not that good and it must be a nightmare to drive after dark. We regretted that we had parked that close to the piste but decided not to move.
We sat in the dark and watched the car approaching very slowly, a few hundreds meters away the car stopped and we saw people (civilian) getting out. They where standing in the front of the car watching the piste (or our tracks). This happened several times and suddenly they stopped maybe 25 metres away from us. We could see that they carried guns and we sat totally quiet, partly behind a big rock. They where staring at the ground before they started to stare directly in our direction, luckily it was completely dark.
After a while they continued…

When we got to Ideles the next morning people knew that we were going to Tam via Assekrem. This info must have come from the soldiers in Serouenout. For some reason people were tense and it was not a very friendly place but we stayed for a few hours to get petrol (petrol station had no petrol and people told us there were no petrol in town). We tried to buy some food but it was impossible, everything was sold out. That’s strange, it has never happened to me before or after.

We sat beside the bikes trying to figure out what to do when we couldn’t get any petrol when some kids came along and started to chat. My friend told them that he would pay them if they could get petrol and after a while they brought us to a guy who sold us 13 liters. He didn’t seem happy about it…

Because of the shortage of petrol we decided to skip Assekrem and went to Tam.via In Amguel.


So why do I write this? What does it mean?
To be honest I don’t know but I learned a few things:

-Don’t tell people where you are going
-Park far from the piste
-Don’t camp before it’s getting dark
-Be careful with lights

Good thinking.
Honestly we also didn't know what was going on exactly. Or who to trust 100%.

Wouldn't it be nice if you could feel secure enough with your campfire that when strangers suddenly appear out of the dark you would simply be happy to have someone to drink tea with?

Was it ever like that in the Sahara?

Here's how they spent some of the ransom money.

‘We don't want to become a second Afghanistan' - The Globe and Mail

"The insurgents had night-vision goggles, bulletproof vests and rocket-propelled grenades. The soldiers carried amulets and Koranic verses for protection. They were also outnumbered 3 to 1. Two hours later, almost half of the 60 soldiers were dead, and the rest were fleeing for their lives."

This was the way our guide planned it - he didn't tell the gendarmes or even us that we were going over Timiaouine instead of Tin Zahouatin until we were well on our way.
The tour operator we contacted for assisting with finding the right guide broke a nervous sweat when I showed him pictures of my kids (after he had showed pics of his). "We will do our very best".
The guide in this area should be a touareg from Kidal.

Been quite a lot of military focus on this region in N and NE Mali recently. Hard therefore to tell whether strongholds have been dislodged. But the advice is well good - steer clear!. Again, if I were AQ-M i'd be thinking E Mauri.

Could well be
but Mauritania has done slightly more to clamp down on Aqim than Mali has
after the French family was attacked just before xmas 2007
the president and the imams were all denouncing violence
they have a good number of suspects behind bars
AFP: Mauritanian Al-Qaeda detainees renounce extremism

some of these guys may well be not guilty of more than associating with Aqim - which is natural since they are intermarrying and establishing themselves in the Mali desert for a decade or more now.

AQ can get about anywhere as we know but as for bases, I agree with priffe's assessment - they prefer to be in far north Mali. Even before it all kicked off the Mori army had bases up at Gallouiya and even way out at Chegga - + that patrol that got done at Tourine. So FWIW the army is up there (and often paying the price...)
Setting aside the supposed infiltration mentioned on the Globe report, what has the Mali army got based up north? Tessalit maybe? Apart from the army/militia raids mentioned (where we read they're so fatigued from the chase they rest up before the attack - and consequently get wiped out!) there is no great risk of resistance in north Mali.
I also suspect the FN Mali terrain is easier to get around on fast; it's been a contrabanders corridor for years. The big band of the Ourane erg in east Mori makes a speedy north-south transit difficult and I believe most wells north of Ouarane are occupied by nomads and close to those Mori bases.

When we crossed this area in 2006 (heading Mori-Mali-Alg) it was notable that the first track we saw after Richat was once we crossed into Mali days later - a clear piste ran N-S soon after the border but well before the salt piste (and not on any map of course).

While GSPC/AQIM have certainly raided into east Mori, based on all my conjecture I cant see them being based there, assuming that is what is being discussed.

Ch

__________________
Morocco Overland 4 (2025) • Trans Morocco Trail

Interesting discussion this.

This is what we seem to agree on:
1) N Mali is hot at the moment
2) AQ-M have their bases in N Mali and have settled in
3) its *objectively* the most dangerous place to go to, esp at the moment

This is where I seem to differ:
1) I expect that AQ-M won't make their next kidnapping in N Mali
2) I expect instead that they will make a move in Mauri

I'm sticking my neck out and given time we will be able to tell either way.

This is why I think N Mali is not the next place for an event to happen:
1) Its getting more difficult for AQ-M to operate in N Mali.
The US is donating kit:
BBC NEWS | Africa | US arms Mali to battle al-Qaeda
and so is Algeria:
Algeria and Mali Join Hands in Combating Terror
2) AQ-M have always been quite versatile and unpredictable with their hits. Who would have thought Tunisia was somewhere you'd be kidnapped and taken to N Mali? Not me. Thinking N Mali is thinking that AQ-M are predictable. To me, their record shows that they like to spread things around.
3) there's lots more tourists going through Mauri than N Mali - easy pickings.

The weakness in this argument are:
1) the water problem in E Mauri which Chris has pointed out and which may well be crucial + distance and terrain
2) the Mauri army may be better than Malian army - I just don't know - priffe has argued thet are.
3) N Mali is very convenient and this convenience might be worth making a stand for.

In the end we are all second guessing what AQ-M want - what they like the most. If they stay in Mali and have a scrap with the Mali army, then its a scrap with Mali that they're after. I don't have any proof for this, but my hunch is that they'd prefer not to have a conventional scrap. Perhaps I'm wrong but scrapping with Malian troops doesnt seem to fit ideologically or with their history. The only reason it seems to happen is that the Malian troops aren't leaving AQ-M alone in N Mali. Given enough heat from the Malian army, I think AQ-M are likely to find somewhere else.

Anyone got any feel for what was going down west of Serouenout with Alibaba? Any AQ-M reading this that can give us a heads-up? (And BTW my real name is Indiana Jones and I've retired to Pitcairn Island).

Could someone remind perhaps - any kidnappings at all took place in N Mali recently?

__________________
-------------------------
https://famous-walker.dreamwidth.org - in Russian but with lots of photos

none - but some on the Mali-Niger border. On the other hand, 3 separate parties (4 if you include 2003) ended up in N Mali. So the assumption is that if you go strolling through the lions den, you'll get eaten.

Here's an example of what Mauri is doing to secure the desert

Mauritania touts counter-terror operations near Mali border (Magharebia.com)

"Mauritanian security forces took reporters on their first-ever tour of counter-terrorism operations in the restive desert region of Adrar on Friday (November 13th), ANI reported.
Adrar is the country's most popular tourist destination but also the infiltration point for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb terrorists from Mali. The 2008 kidnapping and subsequent beheading of 11 Mauritanian soldiers in Aklet Tourine spurred Mauritania to create a special military unit in the north-eastern province. Ever since the Mauritanian Special Forces (GSI) cordoned off the area, "all infiltration areas have been fully identified [and] illegal activities have come to a complete halt," said GSI Commander Sidi Ahmed.

To handle the difficult desert conditions, GSI operatives receive special survival training and learn to master driving in the sand dunes without GPS navigation. An outreach strategy with nomads has also benefitted military counter-terrorism operations in the sparsely-populated region, the GSI officer explained.

"To ensure that the nomads provide information to the army, not the enemy, a support program has been implemented. The GSI facilitates their access to water and medical care and buys their livestock, which dispenses with the need for them to make long trips to the city and ensures their income," he said. "Our intelligence capabilities are enhanced."


It is partly the tense relationship between touaregs and Mali government that makes the Mali desert unpatrolled and unsafe, allowing the Aqim to establish themselves.
The outreach program in Mauritania is probably more important than the military presence in the long run. This is what the Mali governement should do, too.

That is the way to do it (assuming it's not all spin and the GSI are not beating it out of the nomads and stealing their cams). Mori was the most nomadic desert country of all until 40 years ago and today still benefits from the govt and nomads being the same people - Moors. Any internal unrest is just the Moorish clans fighting it out for power as we see once in a while.

The thing is I suspect far N. Mali is a bit like the Libyan Desert - less arid sure but there are no wells or the ground water is too bad and so, apart from the salt mine, there are no nomads to outreach too until you get to the east where they're Tuareg. And as we know Tuareg have their own separate issues with the predominately Bambara Mali govt (who of course despise nomads). Same story in Niger (and up to a point, Sudan): it's post independence payback for the bad old slave trading days - hence the rebellions.

So good on the Moris. In Mali you get a feeling elements of the army are in business with AQIM - like that pile of coke that disappeared off the badly landed plane near Gao the other day...

Ch

__________________
Morocco Overland 4 (2025) • Trans Morocco Trail

Another article dealing with the change in Adrar.
Mauritanian counter-terrorism effort gains ground in Adrar (Magharebia.com)

"Mauritania's measures to bring peace to its restive Adrar region, where terrorists beheaded 11 soldiers last year, are earning positive reviews in the local press and appreciation from the general public.
...
Experts say Adrar, an area known for tourist attractions, has been a key infiltration point for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorists from Mali. It is also a hotspot for trafficking of people and drugs. Army efforts to deal with such problems have included recruiting Adrar's young people for special anti-terrorism units that scour the region for illegal activity.
...
"Since the deployment of the anti-terrorism units to the area, AQIM-linked gunmen have stopped their attempts to ... cross onto Mauritanian soil," Major Sayyid Ahmed Ould Amhimed told the touring journalists in Atar.
...
Journalist Mohammed Al Moukhtar Ould Mohammed praised efforts to keep reporters and the public apprised of developments in Adrar.

"As journalists, we needed to know the details of what's going on in the Mauritanian desert," he said, adding that previously, the army alone gave accounts of events in the region.

"It seems that the national army has understood the importance of involving the press in the battle they are waging in the heart of the desert, something that will add a new dimension to the so-called 'War on Terror'," Mohammed added.

In connection with the counter-terrorism efforts in the Adrar region, Mauritania is also deeply troubled by the loss of the Paris-Dakar Rally, which was relocated in 2008 after four French tourists were slain in the desert. Eight of the rally's 15 stages previously took place in Mauritania, and the event brought enormous economic rewards."